Dynamics of effort allocation and evolution of trust: an agent-based model by Hassani Mahmooei, Behrooz & Parris, Brett
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Dynamics of effort allocation and
evolution of trust: an agent-based model
Behrooz Hassani Mahmooei and Brett Parris
Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash
University, Australia
July 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44919/
MPRA Paper No. 44919, posted 10 March 2013 09:47 UTC
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157328
This is a working paper. Please do not quote its content without authors’ notice. 
1 
 
Dynamics of Effort Allocation and Evolution of Trust: An agent-based model 
Behrooz Hassani-M and Brett W. Parris 
Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash University, VIC 3800, Australia 
Behrooz.Hassani.Mahmooei@monash.edu 
Abstract 
Trust is a dynamic and complex phenomenon and understanding the factors which affect its 
formation, evolution and disappearance is a critical research issue. It has been shown that 
trust plays a key role in how human and social capital develop, how economies grow and 
how societies progress. In this paper, we present an agent-based model of the relations 
between a dynamic effort allocation system, an evolving trust framework and a reputation 
module to study how changes in micro-level rent-seeking traits and decisions can shape the 
emergence of trust across the simulated environment. According to our results, variations in 
trust are correlated more with the returns to being productive, rather than rent-seeking. In line 
with previous studies, our model shows that higher than average levels of risk-taking by 
agents lead to further trust and gains during an interaction, though taken to an extreme, both 
trust and gain can decline as a result of reckless decisions. We also report on the formation of 
trust clusters in our model as an emergent phenomenon. 
1. Introduction 
Research on the role of trust in economies and its relationships to trade and institutions has 
flourished in recent years. Early work included Janet Landa’s studies of ethnic trading 
networks (1981; 1994) and Avner Greif’s (1989; 1993) research on Maghribi traders in 
medieval times. Francis Fukuyama (1995) brought the academic discussion on the 
relationship between trust and economic development to a wider audience with his book 
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (insightfully reviewed by Quddus et 
al. 2000).  
As Labonne and Chase (2010) observed, it is now well established that higher levels of trust 
in a society are associated with higher economic growth rates (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak 
and Knack 2001), higher quality and less corrupt institutions (Porta et al. 1997; Uslaner, 
2002) and better public goods (Ostrom 2000; Ostrom and Walker 2003).  
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Using data from the Philippines for example, Labonne and Chase (2010) showed that 
lowering transaction costs by making connections easier, in this case through road building, 
led to an increase in generalized trust. They also highlighted the frequently overlooked 
endogeneity of trust: It is not simply that high trust environments lead to growth, but that 
growth itself can make possible investments in public goods such as roads, which themselves 
lower transaction costs even further, thereby fostering a further increase in trust.  
Research into trust now encompasses a wide variety of fields, including, for example, the role 
of trust in international relations (Kydd 2005), in the international climate regime (Vogler 
2010), in energy policy (Kydd 2010), in shaping institutions (Wang & Gordon 2011), in 
informal borrowing networks (Karlan et al. 2009), in humanitarian logistics (Tatham and 
Kovács 2010), in human development (Özcan and Bjørnskov 2011), in the relationship 
between culture and development (Breuer and McDermott 2012),  and in experimental 
economics (Johnson and Mislin 2011).  
In this paper, we focus on one particular aspect of the role of trust in economic exchange, 
namely the relations between trust and rent-seeking, which to our knowledge has not been 
studied so far. More specifically, we want to investigate how rent-seeking behaviors of 
individuals and their mutual trust at the micro-level can result in different rates of economic 
growth – as, for example, when they come together for a particular project to produce a 
common product. Rent-seeking behavior during such collaborative projects may include 
effort allocated to activities such as lobbying and bribing which, while they are likely to 
increase the resource allocation returns for the rent-seeker himself, are considered a waste of 
resources and an unproductive allocation when each contract is considered or the economy is 
considered as a whole (Krueger 1974; Tollison 1982; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  
To model the rent-seeking decisions and behaviors of the individuals, here, each agent’s trust 
toward the counterparty to an interaction is coupled with the economic theory of effort 
allocation whereby economic agents can allocate their resources either to productive or to 
unproductive activities (e.g. Bhagwati 1982; Baumol 1990). This theory has been widely 
used to analyze social behaviors especially in the field of rent-seeking and economic conflicts 
(Hausken 2005). The dynamics of model in which agents can allocate effort between 
different options, as discussed later in the paper, depend not only on each of the players 
individually and the sum of their individual decisions and actions, but are also associated 
with complex mutual strategic decisions of individuals about their trust and rent-seeking 
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decisions. We have therefore employed an agent-based computational model to study this 
complex phenomenon. 
Trust has been studied extensively in computational models (Sabater and Sierra 2005), 
including multi-agent systems (Ramchurn et al. 2004). More recently, models of trust have 
also featured in the agent-based modeling literature including by Will (2010) and an 
important exercise in replicating a previously published model of trust, cooperation and 
market formation in the U.S. and Japan (Macy & Sato 2002, 2008; Will & Hegselmann 
2008a, 2008b; Will 2009).  
Considering the literature discussed above, the main contribution of this study is the 
development of an agent-based model which is capable of linking individual rent-seeking 
decisions and risk attitudes and micro-level interaction outcomes with both micro- and 
macro-level social (trust) and economic (gain) concepts through a dynamic social network 
and a reputation module. The model is introduced in the next section, followed by analyses of 
how changes in micro-motives can result in the emergence of new forms of macro-behavior.  
 
2. The Model 
The model is presented using the updated version of the ODD protocol (Grimm, et al 2010) 
where first the model’s building blocks are introduced in the overview section, followed by 
its design concepts and details. The ODD protocol has been used to facilitate possible 
replications or extensions. In some parts the order of titles recommended by the protocol has 
been changed to match the model conditions. The model was implemented using NetLogo 
4.1 (Wilensky 1999).  
2.1. Purpose 
The purpose of this model is to investigate how directly unproductive activities such a bribing 
and lobbying might impact an economy by affecting the trust between the parties engaged in 
a contract. We proceeded by exploring the dynamics of effort allocation to productive and 
unproductive activities and the evolution of trust and reputation in an agent-based model 
where the terms of a contract could be violated by dishonest agents through rent-seeking 
activities. 
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2.2. Entities, state variables and scales 
The model has three main components including players, links, and the reputation module. 
The model starts with N initial players, where N > 3.  Each player has two main 
characteristics including its effort allocation and risk-taking attitude (RTA). Effort allocation 
is represented as a dynamic-size bit vector where, for each bit, if it is 1, the agent will be 
allocating all his effort to productive purposes and so is called honest (H), and otherwise it 
presents rent-seeking behavior and acts dishonestly (D) in interactions through misallocation 
of effort to unproductive conduct. The number of bits in the vector is equal to the number of 
neighbors each agent has, since each bit represents a link to one neighbor. The risk-taking 
level is a normally distributed random variable between 0 and 1 which represents the agent’s 
attitude in trust formation. 
Links are the core of the model. During the linking process, agents connect to the agent 
closest to them which is not already one of their connected neighbors. When there is a link 
between two agents, it means that they can engage in one interaction per tick called a 
“contract”. A contract is implemented using two separate weighted directed links in NetLogo, 
but for simplicity, in the model description we use the term “Link” to refer to both of them. 
Each contract has a value called Income which shows the total amount of utility that can be 
gained from that contract. When two agents are involved in a contract they gain a share of 
that Income, which is accumulated every tick in a variable called Wealth. 
The amount of Income for any contract is a function of the MutualTrust between two agents; 
when agents trust each other more, they are more likely to have contracts with higher possible 
incomes, whereas if the trust degrades, the income will decrease as well. This is implemented 
using a logistic function as Equation 1 where MutualTrust is the sum of agents’ Trust of each 
other. As Trust is between 0 and 1 and MutualTrust is between 0 and 2, α = 7 so that Income 
is between 0 and 1. 
Income = 1 / (1 + exp (α (1 – MutualTrust ) )) (1) 
While Income is a function of Trust, Trust is represented as a dynamic value which is 
affected by the contract outcome as well. If both sides of the contract are honest, or if they 
cannot recognize each others’ dishonesty, Trust increases. Change in the Trust value is a 
function of RTA. Agents with higher RTAs increase their Trust more when they think they are 
in a fair contract and decrease their Trust less when the other agent violates the contract 
terms. 
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If the Trust value for a contract decreases and reaches zero, the Trust link is broken and the 
agent can tag the other agent as a violator. When agent A tags agent B, A will not create a 
link to agent B for period of time dependent on its RTA as it puts Agent B on its blacklist. 
Also A sends a message to its social network to decrease their Trust in B. The decrease is a 
function of each neighbor’s personal RTA and also its trust of A. Agents downgrade their 
trust of a violator more if they are advised to do so by an agent they trust more and/or they 
have lower RTA. 
2.3. Process overview and scheduling 
The smallest unit of time is a “tick” where all main procedures are called once. Since only 
one generation of agents is used in our model, ticks are not associated with agents’ life-
cycles. 
All the agents start with having a fully random effort allocation pattern as they engage in their 
first interaction with their Trust equal to their RTA. During each interaction the possible 
income from that contract is divided among the two engaged agents based on a simple game 
theory model called an Income Distribution Table (IDT). In Table 1, H represents an honest 
attitude in the contract and D stands for a dishonest rent-seeker. Each cell shows the agents’ 
shares from the total possible income.   
Table 1: Income Distribution Table (IDT) format for honest (H) and dishonest (D) agents 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H (HH1, HH2) (HD1, HD2) 
D (DH1, DH2) (DD1, DD2) 
For simplicity, in the majority of simulations we have considered that whenever both agents 
are honest, the income is divided equally between them, so HH1 and HH2 are equal to 0.5. In 
the other three cases, dishonest behavior in the form of violating the contract means that at 
least one agent is allocating effort to unproductive behavior, and so, following the rent-
seeking literature, since some resources are wasted, we assume that the total gain will be less 
than the maximum income. So HD1 + HD2, DH1 + DH2 and DD1 + DD2 are all less than 1. 
Using the same logic, we usually expect DD1 + DD2 to be less than both HD1 + HD2 and 
DH1 + DH2. Also since being dishonest provides agents with an opportunity to have a higher 
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share of the total income, HD1 is smaller than HD2 and DH1 is greater than DH2. Two 
sample IDTs are shown below. Each link between any two agents has its own IDT whose 
values can be produced randomly when the model initiates or can be made similar for all 
links. 
Table 2: Two sample Income Distribution Tables 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H (0.5, 0.5) (0.2, 0.7) 
D (0.6, 0.1) (0.4, 0.3) 
 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H (0.5, 0.5) (0.1, 0.8) 
D (0.8, 0.1) (0.2, 0.4) 
As can be seen in the tables above, not only have we allowed the DH and HD combinations 
to have asymmetric outputs, but the same feature is considered for HH and DD contracts. To 
implement that, we ensured that the contract Income is divided between the agents in correct 
order since NetLogo randomly calls the agents during the simulation.  
When the contracts are concluded, each agent records all the gains separately for each link 
and also adds their gains to their wealth. In the next step of the function (but within the same 
time tick), they compare their outcome with the previous ones to find out if their current 
strategy has performed better and should be recorded for later optimization. The comparison 
is a cyclical procedure as shown in the pseudo code below in Box 1.  
Here cycle is a counter for the iterations of the optimization process and max-cycle shows the 
length of each complete optimization round. If cycle is less than max-cycle, it is increased by 
1 and the current value of gain for each link is added to the value of store for that link. These 
iterations continue until cycle reaches max-cycle. Then if the accumulated amount in each 
link’s store is higher than its previous max-store, store is recorded as max-store and the 
current behavior type, H or D, is stored as the best type. Finally, store and cycle are both 
initiated to start a new round. 
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In the simulation, if an agent changes its type, from H to D or vice versa, both store and cycle 
are reset to ensure that their values always are associated with one specific type. Changes in 
value of max-cycle have been studied in the sensitivity analysis and are discussed in the next 
section. Also to avoid having an elephant memory embedded in the agents, we have added a 
factor to the algorithm, β, which is responsible for degrading the max-store value over time. 
As β is between 0 and 1, it guarantees that agents do not lock in one particular value for max-
store. This provides better dynamics in the model by resembling a process which enables the 
agents to forget this value.  
Box 1: Pseudo-code for recording the type with the highest return 
Ask agents  
[ 
   Ask my-links  
   [ 
      ifelse cycle is equal to max-cycle  
      [ 
         if value of store is higher than maximum store so far  
         [ 
            set max-store to store 
            record the current strategy as the best strategy 
         ] 
         set store 0 and set cycle 0  
      ] 
      otherwise 
      [ 
         Set cycle cycle + 1 and set store store + gain 
         Set max-store max-store – max-store × β 
      ] 
   ] 
] 
During the Check procedure, two main functions are performed. Firstly, for each link, agents 
monitor each others’ type, trying to investigate if the other agent has behaved dishonestly. If 
the other side of the link has been dishonest and the caller can recognize it based on its 
associated probability, the Agent decreases its trust to the other agent, otherwise it increases 
it. Agents decrease their trust based on (1 – RTA) which implies that the higher their risk-
taking the lower their trust decline if they discover dishonesty during a contract and increase 
their trust considering RTA so more risk-loving agents raise their trust more after 
experiencing a fair contract.  
In the second part of Check, the links with Trust equal to or less than zero are broken and the 
violator agent is added to each agent’s blacklist. The agent also invites its connected agents to 
decrease their trust of the violator based on their own (1 – RTA). The proportion of the 
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decrease is simply calculated by multiplying their MutualTrust and the neighbor’s RTA, then 
the amount is deducted from the current value of Trust.  
Four different genetic operators are implemented in the code. Mutation guarantees that the 
agent changes its type over time (between Honest and Dishonest), looking for a type with 
higher return. The other three are all crossovers providing adaptation, learning and 
optimization. For crossovers, each agent takes into account the links’ best-performing type, 
the best type among its links and also the best performing type of its connected agents. The 
rates at which agents adapt to any of these three are provided as inputs on the model 
interface. Finally each agent attempts to expand its social network to increase its income and 
wealth. During this step, agents select an agent which they are not already linked to and also 
is not on their blacklist. The new link can also be recommended by other agents whom the 
caller has a high trust of. As mentioned previously, blacklisting may not be permanent. In that 
case, the probability of a violator being removed from the blacklist is associated with an 
agent’s RTA as it takes longer for agents with lower risk preferences to delete an entry from 
their list. The blacklist removal is a first-in first-out process. 
 
Fig 1: Model Processes, their conditions and probabilities 
Interact 
Record 
Check 
Adapt 
Expand 
Clean-BL 
Update 
 
Procedure Condition Probability (out of 1) 
Interaction N/A 1 
Record Cycle 1 
Check Recognition Avg. 0.25 
Tag Link Break (0.01 to 0.05) 
Genetic Operator Activation Defined Input Rates 
Expand Avg. Trust > RTA 0.0005 
Clean-BL BL size > 0 RTA / 1000 
Update N/A 1 
 
Tag 
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2.4. Design concepts  
Considering the model’s specifications and features, some of the main design concepts are 
introduced in this section. 
2.4.1. Basic principles 
While the model is based on the theory of effort allocation to incorporate an economic 
system, it takes a dynamic game theoretical approach to implement the micro-level 
interaction based on strategic decisions. The model also is enriched with a social network 
which not only serves as the infrastructure for agent-to-agent interactions, but since strategies 
can diffuse through the network, it can also be considered to be an adaptation framework. 
Finally, the tagging system is embedded as an attempt to extend the agent’s individual-level 
perception and decisions to the meso-level. 
2.4.2. Emergence 
Trust and Income both emerge from individual level interactions, since any decisions made 
by agents are not only affected by their individual features such as their RTAs, but also their 
social networks.  
2.4.3. Adaptation 
Beyond merely considering personal experiences, the agents also adapt their decisions by 
taking into account their social network. The adaptation to the experiences of other agents 
can be direct, for instance when the agent receives suggestions from others through the 
reputation system, or indirect as the strategy recommendation can transfer to not-directly-
connected agents via intermediate nodes. 
2.4.4. Objectives 
The main objective of the agents is to increase their Gain from each contract, which is their 
share from the maximum Income. This is subject to a trade-off as allocating all the effort to 
productive activities increases the MutualTrust but has a medium return in terms of personal 
Gain. On the other hand unproductive efforts lead to higher returns, especially if the 
counterparty to the contract is honest and productive, but is likely to decrease the 
MutualTrust and so the maximum Income. 
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2.4.5. Learning 
As mentioned previously, learning is implemented using four genetic operators and their 
associated occurrence probabilities including mutation, link-level crossover, agent-level 
crossover and network-level crossover.  
2.4.6. Sensing 
The agents sense the other agent’s type, if their recognition probability condition is satisfied 
but they cannot identify its best type, Gain, Wealth or even the recognition strength. In other 
words, A may know whether B is honest or not, but A has no way of knowing how wealthy B 
really is. Agents can also sense some variables from their social network, such as the highest 
gaining type without discovering to whom that type belongs. 
2.4.7. Interaction and Stochasticity 
The details about the interaction procedure in the form of contracts were given in the first 
section and the sources of stochasticity in the model are presented in Table 2. 
2.4.8. Observation 
The main observed variables include the trends of honest and dishonest behavior, the 
proportion of agents selecting each of the best types, the mean trust in the model, number of 
links, blacklists’ sizes, broken and created links, agents’ Wealth and links’ Gains. 
2.5. Sensitivity Analysis and Initialization 
In order to decide on the initial conditions, we performed a sensitivity analysis (SA) over the 
main variables in the model. Table 3 shows the variables and their tested values. 
Table 3: Tested values in sensitivity analysis experiment 
Variable Range Variable Range 
Mutation Rate 0.001, 0.002, 0.005 Individual Crossover Rate 0.001, 0.002, 0,005 
Agent Crossover Rate 0.001, 0.002, 0.005 Network Crossover Rate 0.001, 0.002, 0,005 
Initial Links 2, 5, 10 Initial Population 25, 50 
Initial Type 1, Random Max-Cycle 20, 50, 100 
Blacklist Removal Rate 0.001, 0.0005 Link Creation Rate 0.002, 0.0005, 0.0010 
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The above set of initial conditions results in more than 17,496 simulations which are run for 
5000 ticks under five different random seeds (1 to 5). Figure 2 shows the distribution for 
mean Trust for a sample set of 8748 simulations under random seed = 1, covering all the 
combinations except for the initial type.  
 
Fig 2: Distribution of mean Trust over the sensitivity analysis experiments 
According to the full SA results, while increases in the population only slightly affect the 
final Trust outputs (-0.0012% per each extra agent), it can have impacts on the trends due to 
changes in the model dynamics. The impacts are clearer when changes in the population are 
accompanied by higher levels of run-time connectivity, which can lead to higher Trust among 
the agents. The initial number of links is not important in the long-run. Based on these 
observations we decided to run the model with 50 initial agents with three initial contracts.  
Changing the max-cycle does not affect the outputs significantly even at the 90% confidence 
level  although models with higher max-cycles produce outputs with lower variance as they 
experience less variation in their best type. It should be noted that as any change in the link’s 
bit pattern resets the cycle, the max-cycle must be selected in a way that continuous cycle 
initializations are avoided. For that reason we have valued max-cycle at 50. 
Based on the SA outputs, an increase in the rate of all four genetic operators will to some 
extent decrease the trust, but the impacts are not limited to the mean values. High mutation 
rates prevent agents from learning and adapting and increase the amount of noise in the 
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outputs. The SA shows that the proportional values of genetic operators’ probabilities are 
more important than their absolute values. If the mutation rate is proportionally higher than 
the crossover rates, it makes them ineffective and if crossovers are very frequent in relation to 
mutation, agents will be locked in one specific type of behavior, unable to adapt to changes in 
the other agents. 
Finally, considering different combinations in the SA, the mutation rate is set to 0.001. Then 
the link-level crossover probability is 0.004 and for agent-level and network-level crossover 
probabilities it is 0.002. It means that on average, between every two mutations, the agents 
have eight opportunities to adapt. It also is a sensible choice considering the max-cycle, 
because on average, between every two operations, at least two full cycles are possible.  
The final decision is about how frequently new links are created and how long agents keep a 
violator on their blacklist. As for the genetic operators, these two are associated as well. 
According to the SA outputs, if the link creation rate is set to 0.001, the number of created 
links is almost equal to the number of broken links. As a result, this value keeps the number 
of links almost constant in the model. Considering this decision, the blacklist removal rate is 
set to 0.0002, so each violator is blocked for almost five new connections on average. The 
final selected initial conditions are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4:Initial conditions for the model 
Variable Range Variable Range 
Mutation Rate 0.001 Individual Crossover Rate 0.004 
Agent Crossover Rate 0.002 Network Crossover Rate 0.002 
Initial Links 5 Initial Population 50 
Initial Type Random Max-Cycle 50 
Blacklist Removal Rate 0.002 Link Creation Rate 0.001 
Each simulation is run for 50,000 ticks under 30 different random seeds to provide enough 
data for statistical analyses. The main monitored variables include: 1) Average Trust of all 
links and the distribution for all individual links. Since the number of links in the model can 
be different and it is hard to compare this value with a specific objective, we have divided the 
value by m (m – 1), which is the total possible Trust in a model with m agents and two links 
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connecting each two; 2) Links with Honest and Dishonest types as a proportion of all the 
links; 3) Average Gain of all links and the distribution of gain over the links and time; 4) 
Sum of all agents’ Gain and Wealth; 5) Run-time created and broken links (i.e. excluding 
links created when the model is initialized); 6) Number of mutations and crossovers for each 
type per agent for the total model. We also have recorded specific variables in particular 
cases, for instance the distribution of Wealth based on RTA. 
3. Results 
Before presenting the results on how the IDT, RTA and different reputation module values 
can affect the model outputs, we illustrate how a single-run model evolves over time. Figure 
3 shows a sample output for a run with 200,000 ticks based on the IDT presented in Table 5.  
Table 5: Sample run – 200,000 ticks 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H (0.5, 0.5) (0.1, 0.8) 
D (0.8, 0.1) (0.4, 0.4) 
Seed: 32 
As can be seen, while overall Trust increases in the simulation, there were significant 
variations in its level, as the moving average clearly shows in the lower part of the figure. 
The mean value for Trust is 0.043, the standard deviation is 0.0076 and skewness is equal to -
0.47 representing the increasing trend. 
The source of these variations can be partly traced to the proportion of agents who are honest 
or dishonest at any point of time. Figure 4 shows the trend for the proportion of agents who 
select each type over the simulation. The presence of different cycle lengths in the dataset 
shows that it is not directly produced by a single factor, but rather it has emerged from the 
model complexity. 
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Fig 3: Trust trend for a sample simulation. Model produced data (top) and its 5000-moving 
average (bottom) 
 
Fig 4: The proportion of agents with honest (black) and dishonest (red) type in the sample 
model (250-Moving average) 
The important issue in the above figures is that while Trust is rising in the model, the type 
trends do not converge to a specific value but their cyclical behavior continues indefinitely. 
This can be due to an increase in the average amount of Trust per link in trust clusters which 
are introduced later in this section. 
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Changing the Income Distribution Tables (IDTs) 
One of the main factors affecting agents’ decisions is how the contract income is divided 
between two agents. This is a complex topic since not only it is associated with each agent’s 
own type, but it is affected by how the counterparty to the contract responds. Firstly, we ran a 
set of experiments based on Table 6. As can be seen in the table, we keep all the values fixed 
except for HH1 and HH2 which can be one of the numbers from (0 to 0.5 by 0.1) combined 
with a value from a similar array, resulting in 36 different combinations for (HH1, HH2). 
Table 6: IDT for studying the impacts changes in HH1 and HH2 on trust in the model 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H 
((0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5), 
(0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5)) 
(0.2,0.7) 
D (0.7, 0.2) (0.4, 0.4) 
Seeds 1:30 
According to the regression results for Trust against the possible values of HH1 and HH2, 
increases in the values of both variables encourage the agents to raise their trust at 1% 
significance level, HH1 (0.0085, t = 4.47) and HH2 (0.0077, t = 4.053), although R2 is only 
0.17, highlighting the missing contributions by other possible factors. We also test for some 
non-linear relations and the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Running new experiments based on Table 7, we investigated how different combinations in 
HD1, HD2, DH1 and DH2 may affect the Trust distribution in the model.  The simulation 
leads to 256 different runs but only 90 of them are valid since sum of HD1 and HD2, or DH1 
and DH2 is more than one in the rest of cases.  
Table 7: IDT for studying the impacts of changes in HD and DH on trust in the model 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H (0.5, 0.5) 
((0, 0.1, 0.3, 0,5),  
(0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1)) 
D 
((0.5, 0.7, 0.9,1),  
(0, 0.1, 0.3, 0,5)) 
(0.3, 0.3) 
Seeds 1:30 
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The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results presented in Table 8 show that while 
the Gain of the honest agent impacts the results, the coefficients for the dishonest behavior 
are not significant. The upper mid-range R2 in the results below is primarily due to the 
complexities embedded in the model through different feedback loops which decrease model 
sensitivity to the inputs. 
Table 8: Model output for IDT presented in Table 7 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
 
Dependent variable:  Trust 
Regression Statistics 
R Square 0.715606 
Adjusted R Square 0.702223 
Standard Error 4.518956 
Observations 90 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.019546 3.484033 13.7451 2.6E-23 
DH1 -0.00172 3.023191 -1.3906 0.167977 
DH2 0.011115 3.374906 8.0685 4.12E-12 
HD1 0.011192 3.371578 8.1330 3.06E-12 
HD2 -0.00133 3.248934 -1.0026 0.318899 
We finally ran a comprehensive simulation based on the IDT presented in Table 9 which 
covers all the eight type variables.  
Table 9: IDT for studying the impacts of changes in all the IDT values 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H 
((0.4, 0.5), 
 (0.4, 0.5)) 
((0, 0.1, 0.3),  
(0.5, 0.7, 0.9)) 
D 
((0.5, 0.7, 0.9),  
(0.1, 0.3, 0,5)) 
((0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4)  ,  
(0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4)) 
Seeds 1:30 
The results for a linear OLS model are presented in Table 10. We have also tested for 
possible non-linearity in the model but the produced coefficients are either non-significant. 
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Table 10: Model output for Trust against the IDT values presented in Table 9 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT  
 
Dependent variable: Trust 
Regression Statistics 
R Square 0.510643 
Adjusted R Square 0.509402 
Standard Error 24.15425 
Observations 3164 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.0295 6.3508 11.3882 1.79E-29 
DD1 -0.0057 2.9340 -4.7818 1.82E-06 
DD2 -0.005 2.8015 -4.3704 1.28E-05 
DH1 -0.0408 2.8350 -35.2597 6.7E-230 
DH2 0.0029 3.8015 1.9168 0.055349 
HD1 0.0023 3.5272 1.6499 0.099047 
HD2 -0.0429 3.2598 -32.3004 5.3E-198 
HH1 0.0633 8.5882 18.0626 1.77E-69 
HH2 0.0659 8.5882 18.8034 7.56E-75 
     
According to the results, two coefficients for DH2 and HD1, are significant at 95% level 
while the other six at 99%. Based on the estimated coefficients, the main factor which can 
increase trust in this model is ensuring that agents gain the maximum share of income in the 
HH interactions since the positive impacts of a HH type on trust is more 10 times higher than 
the negative effects from a DD type.  
On the other side, agents decrease their trust more when they are honest and their partner is 
not, compared to the situation when they are both dishonest. Using stepwise selection and all-
subset regression (stepAIC1 and leaps2 functions in R (R Development Team, 2011), we tried 
to discover any better possible combination of the explanatory variables with higher levels of 
                                                            
1 It calculates the Akaike information criterion for measuring the goodness of fit.  
Source: http://stat.ethz.ch/R-manual/R-devel/library/MASS/html/stepAIC.html 
2 According to the documentation, leaps “performs an exhaustive search for the best subsets of the variables in x 
for predicting y in linear regression, using an efficient branch-and-bound algorithm.”  
Source: http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/leaps/leaps.pdf 
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R2 or statistical significance, but according to the results, the regression outcome presented in 
Table 10 is the best possible arrangement. 
Changing the RTA 
In order to create communities with low or high levels of RTA, we applied a Gamma 
distribution with the values presented in the Figure 5. In each case, first the distribution is 
produced and then its output is divided by the maximum value to provide us with numbers 
between 0 and 1. 
We also used two other distributions, one with a uniformly distributed RTA between 0 and 1, 
and the second one using a normal distribution, N (0.5. 0.15). In the normal distribution if the 
function produces values less than 0 or higher than 1, it is valued at 0.5. The applied IDT for 
the experiment is presented in Table 10. 
Table 11: IDT for studying the impacts of changes in RTA 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H (0.5, 0.5) (0.1, 0.8) 
D (0.8, 0.1) (0.3, 0.3) 
Seed: 1:30 
First of all, as we expect, in models with higher risk-taking population, more links are 
preserved as less links are broken during the simulation. In the three modes with low risk-
taking, on average, around 30,000 links are cut, leading the model to end with 1.4 links per 
agent, while in the three risk-loving models, on average around 600 links connect the agents 
together at the end, around 10 times higher than the previous case. 
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RTA1: Gamma (2,2) RTA2: Gamma (3,2) 
RTA3: Gamma (4,2) RTA4: Gamma (4,2) inverse 
RTA5: Gamma (3,2) inverse RTA6: Gamma (2,2) inverse 
Fig 5: Sample Gamma distributions used for the RTA experiment 
In the results presented in Figure 6, while increases in RTA lead to higher levels of Gain in 
the environment, the effects are not constant. Extremely high levels of RTA, for instance in 
the RTA6 from Figure 5, can actually decrease the level of Gain, which can be due to the fact 
that extremely risk-loving agents engage in many sub-efficient contacts as they do not break 
their links with the violators. 
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Fig 6: Changes in the contract Gain based on different risk scenarios 
The Reputation Factor 
The third part of results reports how changes in the reputation module affect the model 
outputs. In this section we designed four experiments based on the IDT in Table 12.  
Table 12: IDT for studying the impacts of changes in RTA 
 
Player 2 
H D 
Player 1 
H (0.5, 0.5) (0.1, 0.8) 
D (0.8, 0.1) (0.4, 0.4) 
Seed: 1:30 
In the first scenario (Sc-01) the reputation module is deactivated, in SC-02 when agent A 
breaks its link with a violator B, A’s neighbors (the set {C}) decrease their trust in B as a 
function of their trust in A and their individual RTAs. In Sc-03 the same approach is taken, 
but members of C ask their own neighbors to do the same thing, so two layers of neighbors 
are affected. Sc-04 has a more effective reputation framework as agents only consider their 
RTA in decreasing the trust so they deduct higher values from their trust in B. Finally in Sc-
05, neighbors not only decrease their trust, they also break their link with the violator. The 
changes in the distribution of Trust for these five scenarios are presented in Figure 7.  
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Table 13: Sample results for trust clustering detection in the model 
ANOVA Summary Mean Square 
Between Groups 0.2539 F Stat 2.9879 
Within Groups 0.0849 F Critical 2.311 
 Average Coefficient t Stat Count 
Cluster 1 0.5439 - - 21 
Cluster 2 0.8297 0.285827 -0.0170 18 
Cluster 3 0.5422 -0.00168 1.4571 15 
Cluster 4 0.6708 0.126939 1.7629 24 
Cluster 5 0.7299 0.185991 2.3581 12 
Cluster 6 0.8080 0.264143 3.0522 10 
 
To achieve a more robust result, the model was run under 5 different random seeds, the 
clusters are identified under each seed value, and a pool of clusters is generated containing 
500 agents distributed among 60 clusters. Then one cluster is selected randomly as the 
reference and all the others are compared to that one. According to the results, at least 30 
clusters show statically significant differences when their mean is compared to the reference 
which has the average trust of 0.57. To ensure that this difference is not driven with the mean 
value of the reference, we manually give new mean values to the reference ranging between 0 
and 1, as presented in Table 14. As can be seen, with variations across the range, the 
differences in trust across the clusters are consistent. Removing the clusters with smaller 
number of agents results in the same findings. 
Table 14: Difference in trust when the clusters are compared to different levels of trust mean 
value in the reference cluster 
Mean trust of the reference 0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1 
Number of difference clusters 37 18 10 20 36 53 57 
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Conclusions 
 This study investigated how trust, as an emergent phenomenon, is associated with the micro-
level decisions made by individuals. We presented an agent-based model that is able to 
capture some of the complexities involved in the formation and evolution of trust in an 
environment where agents can be productive or rent-seeking. This was by achieved by 
embedding different levels of adaptation, modeling feedback loops, applying a game 
theoretic interaction framework and taking an asymmetric approach toward information 
sharing and transfer. 
The results suggest that in an environment with the features we have considered, the returns 
to being honest and productive in a contract play the most critical role in encouraging agents 
to avoid rent-seeking behavior such as lobbying and bribing. In other words, providing a fair 
and efficient business environment can motivate agents to avoid allocating effort to 
unproductive activities to increase their gain. The results also show that the trust decreases 
that result from an honest agent encountering a dishonest agent are greater than the positive 
impacts that an honest individual can have on a dishonest one. In other words, the negative 
impacts of rent-seeking behavior on the economic output through the trust link can be higher 
than the direct waste of resources which are allocated to unproductive activities, since the net 
impact of an interaction between an honest and a dishonest agent is more likely to encourage 
the honest one to allocate further effort to rent-seeking. As we also presented in the findings, 
this may even be amplified through clusters of rent-seeking which form across the network. 
We also discussed the fact that while higher levels of risk-taking can lead to more productive 
allocation and Gain in contracts, the relationship is non-linear, so risk-loving agents may 
engage in any kind of interaction without being cautious about the inefficiencies. This 
behavior, as in real life, can result in reductions in both their Trust and their Gain and has 
been verified empirically by studies such as by Roth (2009) who concludes that a curvilinear 
relationship exists between trust and economic growth. 
This model can be extended by calibrating its mechanisms against real-world trends of trust 
across communities with different cultural and business environments and by trying to 
discover specific simulation setups which can reproduce the evolution of trust in actual 
economic networks such as supply chains and manufacturing networks. 
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